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CASE STUDY 
 
The Long Island City Power Outage 
Settlement: A Case Study in  
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
ELEANOR STEIN∗
INTRODUCTION 
 
In April 2008, an extraordinary agreement—styled a Joint 
Proposal—was reached among an adversarial array of 
government, industry, community, and public interest parties.  
The Joint Proposal, negotiated over the course of a year, ended an 
inquiry conducted by the New York State Public Service 
Commission (NYPSC or Commission), the state administrative 
agency that regulates New York’s investor-owned energy utilities.  
The Commission’s staff was investigating the causes of a nine-day 
electric power outage in Consolidated Edison Company of New 
York, Inc.’s (Con Edison) Long Island City, Queens, network, an 
outage that affected as many as 175,000 people.1
 
∗Adjunct, Albany Law School and State University of New York at Albany; 
Administrative Law Judge, New York State Public Service Commission. The 
author would like to thank Administrative Law Judge Jeffrey Stockholm, for his 
valuable suggestions. However, this piece represents solely the author’s opinions 
and not those of the Public Service Commission or any other of its employees. 
  The Joint 
Proposal, as approved, provided for termination of the 
Commission’s review of the utility’s outage-related decisions in 
exchange for a rate benefit of $46 million for all Con Edison 
customers, and a $17 million community benefit fund for Western 
Queens.  This benefit was dedicated half to bill credits to area 
customers, and half to planting trees and delivering additional 
environmental and energy-usage reducing enhancements to the 
 1. See DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., STAFF REPORT ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE 
JULY 2006 EQUIPMENT FAILURES AND POWER OUTAGES IN CON EDISON’S LONG 
ISLAND CITY NETWORK IN QUEENS COUNTY, NEW YORK 2 (2007), 
http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/Web/F813FD973CA23102
85257267004B9E83/$File/LIC_FINAL_REPORT_FEB_9_07.pdf?OpenElement. 
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communities directly affected by the power outage.  Of those 
funds, $500,000 was earmarked for a study of the outage’s 
economic and health consequences.  Finally, Con Edison agreed 
its CEO would sign and send to customers a letter of apology. 
This is an examination of the settlement process leading up 
to this agreement in the context of an administrative proceeding.2  
The agreement reflected the determination and dedication of the 
participating parties, and stands as an example of the critical 
advantage offered by alternative dispute resolution practice: the 
opportunity to create value in a situation where participants are 
polarized or stalemated.3
 
 2. In the initial stages of this investigation, the author presided as 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the establishment of the early procedural 
steps in what began as a New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC) Staff 
investigation.  In April 2006, Judge Jeffrey Stockholm was assigned to preside 
over a second, litigated prudence phase, and the author became the mediator. 
The NYPSC has an active alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practice, spelled 
out in detail on its web site. N.Y. State Public Service Commission, Dispute 
Resolution at the Department of Public Service, http://www.dps.state.ny.us 
/ADR_Overview.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). Not only are numerous 
individual cases resolved through alternative dispute resolution methods but, 
these approaches have been institutionalized. Both a litigation and a settlement 
ALJ will be assigned to new cases, where appropriate. The two judges do not 
communicate about substantive matters under discussion at the negotiating 
table. This protocol prevents the decision-maker from learning about settlement 
offers. Parties have the opportunity to sit down with each other and a neutral 
mediator; and at the same time to litigate unresolved disputes before a litigation 
judge. A mediator is bound to protect, and not disclose, the substance of 
negotiations, discussions or offers to settle. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, 
§ 3.9(e) (2009). Therefore, this essay relies exclusively on the public record in 
this proceeding, as well as general sources and experts in the mediation field on 
the theory of complex, multi-party public policy dispute resolution. The official 
record of this proceeding is available at N.Y. State Public Service Commission, 
Queens Power Outage, http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894.htm (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2009). 
  Changing the terms of the discourse, 
not once but repeatedly, opened possibilities for agreement even 
when some parties perceived the negotiation as a zero-sum 
situation where no agreement seemed possible.  And the parties’ 
Joint Proposal, approved by the Commission, afforded a multi-
faceted and meaningful outcome, beyond the authority of an 
administrative agency otherwise left to craft equitable remedies. 
 3. ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE 
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 101-05 (2000) (exploring the concept of 
negotiation and mediation, in contrast to litigation, not simply distributing 
benefits but actually creating value). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/11
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I.  MULTI-PARTY PUBLIC POLICY DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
The mediation of a complex, multi-party, public policy 
dispute is in some ways just like a two-party private mediation.  
All the same tools are brought to bear and the same basic stages 
of mediation are negotiated.  Practitioners and theorists divide 
and name these stages differently, but there is a lingua franca.  
The first stage can be called a contracting stage, when the 
mediator explores the negotiation process with parties so that all 
participants become familiar with mediation4 and agree on 
ground rules, such as confidentiality, mutual respect, or how 
much time to set aside for the mediation.  The next stage involves 
active listening, to elicit from parties the interests or concerns 
that underlie their litigation positions, moving from positional 
bargaining to interest-based bargaining.5  Critical to this stage of 
the mediation process is the mediator’s continual role in 
encouraging all parties to identify their Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).6
As in most cases, during the Long Island City dispute, the 
parties bargained in the shadow of the law and the 
administrative litigation continued in parallel with the 
  After all, any outcome can 
only be realistically and productively evaluated in comparison to 
the possible outcomes of proceeding with the administrative 
litigation.  If parties remain focused on what litigation will 
provide them, they will tend to seek a negotiated outcome, if for 
no other reason than to avoid placing their fate entirely in the 
hands of the final decision-maker, who is likely to be unaware of 
the full ramifications of the dispute outside the formal record. 
 
 4. In some cases observed by the author, NYPSC mediators have brought in 
a skilled trainer, to expose the negotiating parties to the basic tools and 
principles of alternative dispute resolution. 
 5. See CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 329-31 (2005). The common use of a phased approach 
should not mask the differences among practitioners and across a wide spectrum 
of mediation approaches (from strongly mediator-directed to strictly party-
controlled). Id. at 302-28. 
 6. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 1991) (1983) 
(contributing to the popularization of the critical concept and breakthrough 
approach known as BATNA); see also MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 5, at 
125. 
3
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negotiations.  As the legal framework of the proceeding evolved 
and developed, the respective risk exposures and potential 
benefits of the litigation solution swirled and changed as well.  In 
contrast to the commonly used alternative of halting litigation to 
allow negotiations to progress, in this case, the administrative 
litigation provided a backdrop that may have brought the 
negotiating parties closer to common ground. 
From the identification of the parties’ respective interests 
comes a brainstorming of options for settlement.  In the course of 
this process, some bases for what Fisher and Ury term “principled 
negotiation”7
While these stages are common to private and public policy 
dispute resolution, a public policy dispute presents some unique 
process challenges for a mediator.  Among these stages is the 
importance of ensuring that all necessary parties are notified that 
discussions are ongoing and that they have the opportunity to 
take a seat at the negotiating table.  Another is the need to, on 
the one hand, protect the confidentiality of the mediation process 
and, on the other, respect the value of transparency in 
government.  This tension characterizes public disputes but not 
private ones.
 can emerge in determining what the objective 
standards or bases for an agreement are.  The last stage, or 
execution, entails bringing the parties together, ensuring that 
they understand the process that is set in motion when they 
submit a Joint Proposal to the Commission for its final 
determination. 
8  The model mediation statutes may protect the 
confidentiality of the private negotiating table, but fall short on 
recognizing that negotiation may be producing results that affect 
the public far beyond the participants.9
 
 7. See FISHER & URY, supra note 6, at xviii, 10. 
  In the context of the 
NYPSC, a settlement among the parties is merely a Joint 
 8. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL, supra note 5, at 392-93 (citing Lawrence 
Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. 
REV. 1 (1981) (discussing how private mediations may implicate larger, public 
concerns)). For example, in an environmental mediation, parties may reach an 
agreement, but that agreement may fail to take into account impacts on a 
broader familyof natural resources. 
 9. See, e.g., 2009 N.Y. Assem. B. No. 8497 (proposing the Uniform Mediation 
Act, amending the Civil Practice Law and Rules by adding new article 74 to 
provide, in pertinent part, that “a mediation communication is privileged . . . 
and is not subject to discovery or admissible in evidence in a proceeding”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/11
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Proposal to the Commission.  The Joint Proposal must be filed, 
and once that happens, it enters the public realm entirely.  It will 
be subject to public comment, statements in support and in 
opposition will be heard, and an evidentiary hearing is held on 
the record.  Without Commission approval, a Joint Proposal has 
no legal effect and the Commission may modify it and decide to 
reject some or all of its terms as contrary to public policy.10
Almost two years after the outage, and following one year of 
mediated negotiations, parties crafted an agreement that 
provided value to the participants, the utility, New York City and 
the Western Queens community. 
 
II.  THE JULY 2006 ELECTRIC POWER OUTAGE AND 
THE COMMISSION INVESTIGATION 
From late July through early August 2006, New York City 
experienced two protracted and severe heat waves.  The city 
suffered three consecutive days at or above 100 degrees, following 
five days in the 90-degree range.  A New York City Department of 
Health study attributed 140 excess deaths to the heat, including 
forty from heat stroke.11  This was New York’s highest heat 
stroke mortality on record since 1952.12
 
 10. For example, parties to a Commission proceeding concerning the siting  of 
electric or natural gas transmission facilities may seek Commission approval of 
the terms of a Joint Proposal mutually arrived at and to the satisfaction of all 
parties. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW art. VII (McKinney 2009). However, the 
Commission is required to make certain findings and determinations in order to 
grant a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the 
construction of a transmission facility. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 126(1) (McKinney 
2009). These findings include that the facility is needed and that it represents 
the minimum adverse environmental impact. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW §§ 126(1)(a)-
(c). Therefore, the Commission makes such findings independent of and not 
bound by the parties’ consensus as reflected in their Joint Proposal. The instant 
case illustrates the Commission’s practice of, at times, modifying an agreement 
of all parties—even when one of those parties is Department of Public Service 
Staff. See infra The Public Service Commission Adoption of the Joint Proposal 
Terms at Part III.E. In approving the settlement, the Commission also modified 
it in certain respects. 
 
 11. Richard Perez-Pena, Heat Wave was a Factor in 140 Deaths, New York 
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
11/16/nyregion/16heat.html; see also Mathias Vuille, Professor, Dep’t of 
Atmospheric and Envtl. Scis. at Univ. of Albany, Presentation at Albany Law 
School, The Science of Climate Change: Current Knowledge, Uncertainties and 
Projects, slides 24-26 (June 24, 2009) (discussing how the July 2006 New York 
City heat wave was only a shadow of the one in Europe in August 2003, 
5
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Beginning on July 17, Con Edison experienced problems with 
its electric network in Long Island City, Queens.  In a perfect 
storm of cascading events, critical elements known as feeders13
 
considered the cause of 22,000-35,000 heat-related deaths). An event such as the 
European heat wave was expected to occur naturally once in 1,000 years, but 
scientists now predict that by 2040 that will be an average summer and by 2060 
it will be a cold summer, according to Professor Vuille. No specific weather 
pattern, even a heat wave, can be linked to global climate change, and the 
record and findings in the Long Island City investigation did not attribute the 
outage to climate change effects. However, North American temperatures are 
predicted to rise over the next decades, and there are some practical lessons 
from what may be a random series of weather events or may be precursors of 
what is to come. Cities are engineered to certain parameters of what is expected. 
For example, Washington, D.C. can be paralyzed by a snowfall that would 
barely be noticed in Buffalo, New York. Our subway systems, shorelines, 
airports, and electric power distribution systems are designed to withstand 
predictable stresses. When stresses advance beyond what was predicted 
historically, systems can and do fail. The recurring and intensifying heat waves, 
hurricanes, and floods of the last ten years are causing some cities to reexamine 
their flood plain mapping, electric system design and other assumptions, to 
anticipate and adapt to climate change effects. 
 in 
Con Edison’s system failed.  Faced with the choice of maintaining 
the network in operation and trying to repair it in that state, or 
shutting it down entirely, Con Edison’s emergency leadership 
 12. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH AND MENTAL HYGIENE, N.Y. CITY VITAL SIGNS 
INVESTIGATION REPORT NOVEMBER 2006 SPECIAL REPORT (2006), http://home2. 
nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/survey/survey-2006heatdeaths.pdf; see also 
Perez-Pena, supra note 11 (defining the term excess deaths to represent deaths 
beyond those statistically expected over a given time period in a given location). 
 13. See CON EDISON, INITIAL REPORT ON THE POWER OUTAGES IN 
NORTHWEST QUEENS 1.4-1.6 (2006), http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894/06 
E0894_CE_Initial_Power_Outage_Report.pdf (the Con Edison system is 
enormous and complex. Power plants generate electricity that is transmitted 
over high-voltage, long distance transmission lines. As described by Con Edison, 
these transmission lines,   
supply area substations where the voltage is reduced . . . From the area 
substations, primary feeders distribute the power and feed a secondary 
system. One type of secondary system is called a network system in 
which each feeder supplies a network grid of transformers located 
throughout local streets. These transformers serve to further reduce the 
voltage for use by customers.  
Id.  
In the case of the Long Island City event, a North Queens substation 
supplied the Long Island City network via a total of twenty-two feeders. Long 
Island City used a network design, built entirely underground, and designed to 
sustain the loss of up to two feeders on a peak summer day. On the worst outage 
days, Con Edison lost twelve of the twenty-two feeders in the Long Island City 
network. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/11
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decided to continue operating the network with a reduced 
capacity, mobilizing its customers to lower their usage.  However, 
the network failures continued to spread until July 25, with 
extensive and protracted customer outages.14  On July 26, the 
New York State Public Service Commission, after monitoring the 
unfolding outage and its consequences, instituted a new 
proceeding: a Department of Public Service Staff (Staff) 
investigation, and this process was set in motion.15
At the Commission’s direction,
 
16 the Staff began an 
exhaustive examination of the circumstances leading to the 
failure of the feeders and the customer outages.  The process 
encompassed discovery, independent investigation, and an 
informal technical conference at which experts for the utility, the 
Staff, the City and others exchanged information about the 
circumstances and hour-by-hour decisions the company made 
during this crisis.17
 
 14. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of 
the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power Outages in Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York, Inc.’s Long Island City Electric Network, Order 
Instituting Proceeding and Directing Staff Investigation (July 26, 2006), 
available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/ WebFileRoom.nsf/Web/0663A 
4CE668EE579852571B700671EB5/$File/06e0894_07_26_06.pdf?OpenElement. 
  Parties began to formulate their own 
theories about the course of action Con Edison had taken, and 
whether or not it was, in regulatory parlance, “prudent.”  During 
this process, the utility was restoring its network, replacing 
damaged equipment, and reassuring its customers and the City 
that the crisis was over.  In addition, Con Edison had already 
 15. Id. The New York State Department of Public Service is an executive 
agency established by Section 3 of the Public Service Law. The Public Service 
Commission’s members are appointed by the governor for six-year terms, with 
advice and consent of the State Senate. The governor appoints a commission 
chairman, who is also the chief executive officer of the Department and oversees 
its staff,  pursuant to Public Service Law § 5. 
 16. Id. at 1. 
 17. On February 7, 2007, Department of Public Service staff issued its final 
report on the Con Edison Long Island City outage; the report details both the 
day-to-day unfolding of the outage, and the process used in conducting the 
investigation. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV. COMM’N, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SERVICE STAFF REPORT ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE JULY 26, 2006 EQUIPMENT 
FAILURES AND POWER OUTAGES IN CON EDISON’S LONG ISLAND CITY NETWORK IN 
QUEENS COUNTY, NEW YORK 14-15 (2007) [hereinafter LIC STAFF REPORT], 
available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894/06E0894 _Comments_attnbzth. 
Pdf.  
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voluntarily eschewed recovery of $59 million in operation and 
maintenance expenses resulting from the outage.18
Long Island City, in northwestern Queens, is a vibrant 
community, including single family and apartment houses, its 
streets lined with Greek, Italian, and Spanish restaurants and 
small businesses ranging from bakeries to computer services.  
Con Edison had roughly 115,000 customer accounts in Long 
Island City, estimated to serve 460,000 people.
 
19  As the 
investigation proceeded, so did the public inquiries and outcry 
over the duration and the consequences of the outage in the Long 
Island City community.  As part of its investigation, the 
Commission held a series of nine public statement hearings over 
all the affected neighborhoods in Western Queens: Woodside, 
Long Island City, and Astoria.20
 
 18. Id. at 11. Under normal circumstances, Con Edison would not be able to 
recover these costs unless the Commission granted a petition to defer the costs 
for future recovery. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 61.1 (2009). If the 
Commission found the company acted imprudently, the petition would be 
denied. 
  At these hearings, with Arabic, 
Greek, Korean, Spanish and Turkish interpreters available, a 
parade of Con Edison customers berated both the utility and the 
regulators.  Speakers included elderly apartment dwellers 
stranded without refrigeration or air conditioning during the heat 
wave and owners of local electronics services businesses, who 
 19. In this report, Con Edison places its Long Island City “customer” total at 
115,000). This figure represents utility accounts, rather than individuals. Staff 
estimates that a typical utility account serves four individuals. CON EDISON, 
INITIAL REPORT ON THE POWER OUTAGES IN NORTHWEST QUEENS 2.1 (2006), 
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894/06E0894_CE_Initial_Power_Outage_Report
.pdf. 
 20. Press Release, Public Service Commission, Chairman Flynn Initiates 
Broad Investigation of Queens Power Outage (July 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894.htm (announcing hearings in Astoria & 
Long Island City, Queens); Announcement, N.Y. State Public Service Comm-
ission, Announcement of Additional Public Hearing Regarding Queens Power 
Outage (July 28, 2006), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06 E0894.htm 
(announcing an additional hearing in Astoria); Press Release, Public Service 
Commission, New Location and Time for NYPSC Power Outage Hearings on 
August 3rd & 9th (July 31, 2006), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06 
E0894.htm (announcing hearings in Astoria); Notice, N.Y. State Public Service 
Commission, Notice of Additional Public Statement Hearings and Educational 
Forums (Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/06E0894.htm 
(announcing hearings in Astoria and Woodside). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/11
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recounted narratives of their vulnerable equipment irreparably 
damaged by repeated outages and associated voltage variations. 
On February 9, 2007, the Staff issued its final report on the 
causes and extent of the Long Island City outage.21  In its report, 
the Staff concluded that about 174,000 people lost service or 
experienced low voltage.22  Other extensive reports were also 
published by the New York State Assembly, the New York State 
Attorney General, the City of New York and, as required by law, 
Con Edison itself.  In its report, Con Edison acknowledged an 
unusually large number of customer outages.  Regretting the 
event, Con Edison concluded it acted reasonably and that its 
actions prevented a wider network shutdown and further 
damage.23  The Department of Public Service Staff report, 
although focused on contemporaneous repair and restoration of 
the damaged network, concluded that the company failed to 
address underlying network problems or take appropriate actions 
to minimize the impact of feeder and other failures.24  In 
addition, the Staff report concluded the utility lacked effective 
communication with its customers and public officials about the 
extent of the outage, and that Con Edison’s performance was 
unreason-able.25  In many respects, other parties, including New 
York City, the Attorney General, Western Queens Power for the 
People, New York State Assembly members, and the Utility 
Workers agreed.  Many parties urged the Commission to expand 
its investigation to include a review of the prudence26
 
 21. LIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17. 
 of Con 
 22. Id. at 2. 
 23. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of 
the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power Outages in Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York, Inc.’s Long Island City Electric Network, Order 
Commencing Prudence Investigation 2-3 (Apr. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Prudence 
Order]. 
 24. See LIC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 6. 
 25. Id. at 8. 
 26. The concept of “prudence” in utility law is a fundamental one; a regulated 
investor-owned utility may only charge its customers for costs of delivering 
service incurred prudently—that is, reasonably. A prudence investigation by a 
regulatory agency is likely to examine whether the utility behaved in a 
reasonable manner, under the circumstances present at the time of the disputed 
conduct. Courts have upheld a “general prudence standard” as “what a 
reasonable person would do under the circumstances without the benefit of 
hindsight.” Rochester Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 501 N.Y.S.2d 951 (App. 
Div. 1986). In addition, “[h]istorically, utility expenditures initially have been 
9
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Edison’s decisions during the outage, and its maintenance of its 
system and communications with its customers in advance of the 
crisis.  Indeed, the lack of effective communications with 
customers, the press, and government emerged as a major theme 
of both the investigations and the subsequent negotiations.  Many 
of Con Edison’s customers felt uninformed and misinformed 
throughout the crisis. 
By its order issued April 18, 2007, the Commission expanded 
the scope of this proceeding to determine the prudence of Con 
Edison’s actions and practices relating to the outage.27  The 
Commission charged the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with a 
threshold determination as to whether the Staff Report provided 
“a tenable basis for raising the specter of imprudence [such that] 
the utility can be called upon to defend its conduct.”28
III. THE MEDIATION 
 
A.   The Contracting Stage 
On the eve of the Commission’s decision to expand the 
investigation to a prudence review, Con Edison proposed to seek 
an alternative resolution; however, a public exploratory 
discussion with parties found no takers, and the prudence 
proceeding went forward.29  Months later, after considerable 
discovery and motion practice, exploratory discussions with 
several parties led to Con Edison filing and serving all active 
parties with a notice of impending settlement negotiations.30
In order to bring the necessary parties to the table, efforts 
were first exerted to ensure that the affected community was 
represented.  One community group, Western Queens Power for 
the People, was formed during the outage and dedicated itself to 
 
 
assumed to be exercises of reasonable managerial judgment.” See In re New 
York City Hous. Auth. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 260 N.Y.S.2d 340 (App. Div. 
1965), modifying 17 N.Y.2d 246 (citing Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Tel. Co. v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n., 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also 
Long Island Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 615, 620 (App. Div. 
1987). 
 27. Prudence Order, supra note 23. 
 28. Id. at 18 (quoting Long Island Lighting Co., 523 N.Y.S.2d at 620). 
 29. Prudence Order, supra note 23, at 14-15. 
 30. This filing, and the notice to all parties, is required by Commission 
regulation. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 3.9(a) (2009). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/11
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participating in the negotiations.  In addition, city and local 
representatives, including the City itself, the Office of the Queens 
Borough President, several members of the New York State 
Assembly (most actively Richard Brodsky), the Attorney General, 
and other consumer advocates participated and contributed.  
Appropriately “setting the table”—agreeing on its shape—is 
anything but trivial and was a meaningful first step.31
The discussions took place under the scrutiny of both press 
and politicians.  Therefore, the tension between the confiden-
tiality of the settlement process and the need for transparency for 
the many government parties to resolve issues of public 
importance, posed threshold issues for the ADR efforts.  
Addressing these issues meeting-to-meeting, rather than 
attempting to enforce an embargo on any public discussion of 
mediation effort proved useful in allowing the discussions to move 
forward.
  For this 
process, agreeing that all negotiation meetings would be held in 
New York City during the evening represented and symbolized 
the strong commitment on the part of the Albany-based NYPSC 
staff towards an inclusive process. 
32
The thorniest issue in public policy dispute resolution is that 
of confidentiality, a hallmark of settlement theory and practice.  
The principle of inadmissibility of settlement offers is embodied 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
 
33  At the NYPSC, the 
broader principle of confidentiality of negotiations is institution-
alized in regulations of the agency.34
 
 31. See Andrew D. Seidel, The Use of the Physical Environment in Peace 
Negotiations, 32 POL. & DESIGN SYMBOLISM 19 (1978), available at http://www. 
jstor.org/pss/1424284 (for a thoughtful exploration of agreeing on the shape of 
the table, evoking the international negotiations to end the war in Vietnam—at 
a round table). 
  At the same time, the 
 32. The language of the NYPSC rule governing confidentiality of settlement 
discussions provides sufficient flexibility to encompass several approaches.  
Ultimately, the parties to the negotiations can establish the level of 
confidentiality to some extent, as long as the decision is unanimous. See N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 3.9(d) (2009) (providing that parties shall not 
disclose discussions, admissions, concessions and offers to settle “without the 
consent of the parties participating in the negotiations”). 
 33. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(b). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 
“[e]vidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to 
determine costs.”  Id. 
 34. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, §§ 3.9(d) & (e) (2009) (discussing 
settlement and meditation respectively). 
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agency in developing the regulations, also had to ensure that 
parties and the public had early and effective notice that 
settlement negotiations were being commenced.  Notice must be 
given once preliminaries are completed and the possibility of 
settlement is real.  The NYPSC rules ensure notice to all active 
parties to the proceeding. 
While the agency must ensure transparency and public 
accountability as much as possible, it also must ensure that the 
substance of negotiation sessions or offers to settle remains 
confidential.35
 
  Further, the Commission adopted an additional 
rule to guarantee protection of confidentiality by the mediator.  
The rule provides, in pertinent part:  
[n]o discussion, admission, concession or offer to stipulate 
or settle, whether oral or written, made during any 
negotiation session concerning a stipulation or settlement 
shall be subject to discovery, or admissible in any 
evidentiary hearing against any participant who objects to 
its admission” and that participating parties “shall hold 
confidential such discussions, admissions, concessions and 
offers to settle and shall not disclose them . . . without the 
consent of the parties participating in the negotiations.”36
 
 
Specifically as to mediators, NYPSC regulations provide that 
these confidentiality provisions “shall apply to a neutral and any 
agent or employee of the Department of Public Service 
participating in a mediated proceeding. A mediated proceeding is 
any process in which an alternative dispute resolution technique 
is used to resolve an issue in controversy, where a neutral may be 
appointed.”37
Parties to negotiations of this type frequently become divided 
on the interpretation of NYPSC regulations and make their diver-
gent views known to the press and other media outlets.  To deal 
  The interpretation of these regulations is often a 
subject of dispute, especially where a sizeable community has 
been affected. 
 
 35. In addition to the regulations protecting the confidentiality of settlement 
negotiations and mediations, section 15 of the Public Service Law makes it a 
misdemeanor for an employee of the Department of Public Service to divulge 
any confidential information.  See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 15 (McKinney 2009). 
 36. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 3.9(d) (2009). 
 37. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 3.9(e) (2009). 
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with divergent interpretations, the parties can work together to 
develop an interpretation agreement that serves as workable 
guideline for confidentially requirements. 
Another aspect of the contracting phase is to ensure that all 
parties understand the process.  In a public policy dispute, the 
public itself is likely to be sitting at the table, sometimes in the 
form of community advocates with little experience in complex 
administrative proceedings, and with scarce resources for 
extensive participation.  These advocates demand and need to 
know what a Joint Proposal is; what it means to agree to it; how 
it is binding; what will happen before the Commission; who has 
the right to oppose a Joint Proposal; and how a party can speak 
up in opposition if some but not all of the parties reach an 
agreement.  Clarifying these questions at the commencement of 
negotiations, and developing the answers at every stage are key 
mediator functions. 
Finally, the initial contracting phase is a decisive one for the 
mediator.  Any successful mediation practice is based upon the 
development of a level of trust between the participating parties 
and the mediator.  Unlike the presiding judge, the mediator has 
no inherent authority, as parties are under no obligation to settle 
or to engage with a mediator.  Parties are always free to negotiate 
without a neutral and any party is free to walk away.  While a 
court may require parties to sit down with a mediator, even 
repeatedly, a court cannot order the parties to settle.  Therefore, 
the mediator earns a place at the table only by providing a service 
that the parties come to value.38
 B. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law
  If there is no added value, then 
there is no seat. 
39
The mediation took place against the background of basic 
principles of public utility regulatory law.  First, public utilities 
are generally not liable for consequential damages resulting from 
utility service problems or failures, and regulatory agencies have 
 
 
 38. Expert mediators and teachers Linda Singer and Michael Lewis of the 
Washington, D.C. Center for Dispute Settlement sometimes force this precept 
home in their mediator training. The first task of each participant is to convince 
the parties they need a mediator, and that he or she is the one. 
 39. MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 101-05. 
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authority over rates and service, but none to award civil damages 
or require equitable remedies.40  Second, some, including Con 
Edison, have tariff provisions setting a level of compensation to 
customers for food spoilage in the event of outages of specified 
duration.  Following the 2006 outage, that level was raised by a 
modest amount, and for maximum reimbursement, required 
documentation from the customer on perishables lost due to lack 
of refrigeration.41
A prudence review, however, is the classic hammer of utility 
regulators.  Generally, a regulated utility is entitled to recoup 
rates of all its prudently incurred expenses, a process which 
includes a rebuttable presumption of prudence.
  In addition, many residential customers 
received refunds of approximately $3 representing a prorated 
credit for the days without electric service.  This minimal 
compensation only further enraged many in the community. 
42
 
 40. For example, the Commission can only recover a penalty or enforce its 
orders or regulations by bringing an action to seek a court order for doing so.  
N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2009). 
  The standard 
for what is considered “prudent” is that the utility’s decisions and 
 41. The Commission increased the reimbursement for lost perishable food 
from $150 to $200, when residential customers produce an itemized list of 
losses; and from $350 to $400 when residential customers produce an itemized 
list and proof of loss. In addition, the Commission for the first time required 
utility reimbursement for losses of perishable medication. Total reimbursement 
per incident was capped at $15 million. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power 
Outages in Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.’s Long Island City 
Electric Network, Order Concerning Tariff Provisions Governing Reimbur-
sement for Food Spoilage 19-21 (Nov. 23, 2007) (on file with author). 
 42. The Public Service Law does not define “prudence.” The prudence 
doctrine arises from the broad general powers of the regulatory commission to 
establish just and reasonable utility rates that compensate utility shareholders 
for prudent or reasonable investment, and protect ratepayers from the burden of 
unreasonable management investment. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66(12) 
(McKinney 2009). The burden of proof ultimately lies with the utility seeking a 
change in rates. See N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 72 (McKinney 2009). The prudence 
review power is described at length in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. New 
York Public Service Commission,   
[i]n the exercise of its rate-making power, the Public Service Commission 
may not deny a utility a reasonable rate of return on its investment . . . 
The opportunity to earn a fair return does not mean, however, that a 
utility will be permitted to include negligent or wasteful expenditures in 
its operating expenses.  
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 507 N.E.2d 287, 291 (N.Y. 
1987). 
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actions, under the circumstances at the time, were reasonable.  
The regulator is not entitled to apply the wisdom of hindsight to 
those actions and decisions.  Should the regulator conclude, after 
a hearing, that the utility acted imprudently, then those costs 
incurred as a result of the imprudent action will be disallowed 
and the imprudent investment will be removed from the 
company’s rates.43  These costs, in other words, will be borne by 
the utility’s shareholders, not its customers.  This is the harshest 
remedy available to the regulator without judicial imprimatur, 
and its consequences can be costly to the utility.44
These limited remedies are the only ones available to the 
regulator by law.  The limitations themselves, however, created 
the conditions for parties to seek more satisfying forms of redress 
and resolution.  To do so, they were forced to seek voluntary or 
consensus remedies.  In other words, the limitations of utility law 
lower the BATNA for the parties seeking more meaningful or 
holistic concessions from the utility. 
  However, it is 
not a remedy likely to afford comfort to any particular customer 
or group of customers, as the rate adjustment is spread across the 
entire customer base, and ends up as pennies on an individual’s 
monthly bill. 
For those seeking redress against a utility, however, the 
possibility of a public finding by the regulator that a utility’s 
conduct was imprudent may have a symbolic value all on its own.  
Parties had to assess the limitations of a litigated case and if the 
case proceeded to a litigated outcome, knowing that if the 
Commission were to find the company imprudent and reduce 
system-wide rates accordingly, no additional remedies would be 
available to community members.  This is inherently a difficult 
balance to strike and can only be resolved by the addition of 
positive value on the side of the settlement.45
The mediation goal should be to assist parties in moving 
away from a purely distributive solution (a fifty-fifty split is the 
 
 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Long Island Lighting Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 523 N.Y.S.2d 615, 
624 (App. Div. 1987) (noting that the prudence investigation into cost overruns 
during the construction of the former Long Island Lighting Company’s 
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station resulted, after judicial review, in over $600 
million in prudence disallowances). 
 45. Or, as many mediators say, “It’s a good idea to try to enlarge the pie 
before you start to slice it up.” 
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paradigm) and towards a more lasting and profound resolution.  
This depends upon the parties identifying an objective standard 
of some kind, to move from a position-based to a principle-based 
negotiation.46
C. Identifying the BATNA: What were Parties’ Best     
  In this case, the standard emerged as one of 
returning value to the community; value which had been reduced 
by the outage and its circumstances.  Against this standard, a 
varied set of measures to return value began to emerge at the 
negotiating table, creating the conditions for execution of an 
agreement. 
Alternatives to Settlement? 
A key February 2008 ruling by Administrative Law Judge 
Stockholm may have raised the utility’s estimate of its exposure 
in the face of an ongoing and possibly expanded prudence review, 
as well as potentially increasing the utility’s exposure to civil 
damages.47  In July 2007, parties filed arguments and evidence 
intended to establish a prima facie case of utility imprudence, to 
shift the burden of production of evidence of prudence to the 
utility.  The purpose of the ruling was to determine which of the 
numerous imprudence allegations levied by some parties against 
the utility required a response from Con Edison.  In the judge’s 
words, the question as to each imprudence allegation was 
“whether sufficient facts have been alleged and causal arguments 
posited that a reasonable person would require Con Edison to 
submit an affirmative case.”48
 
 46. FISHER & URY, supra note 6, at 83. 
  The judge reviewed each listed 
allegation, and upheld most allegations as requiring a Con Edison 
response.  These were grouped, and included: (1) failing to have 
in place protocols or information systems to effectively assess 
distribution system conditions; (2) failing to adequately upgrade 
and maintain its Long Island City distribution system in the 
years leading up to the outage; (3) failing to have adequate 
 47. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of 
the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power Outages in Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York, Inc.'s Long Island City Electric Network—Prudence 
Phase, Ruling on Scope of Testimony, Schedule, and Discovery (Feb. 8, 2008), 
available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/0/7ED475CE 
D8AD31A6852573E900770D0D/$File/06e0894_Ruling.pdf?OpenElement. 
 48. Id. at 5. 
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emergency preparedness plans; and (4) failing to take reasonable 
steps to reduce load before and during the outage.49
In addition, the ALJ ruled that the Consumer Protection 
Board and the Attorney General raised a convincing argument 
that the company’s actions should be measured against a gross 
negligence standard.  A Commission finding that Con Edison was 
grossly negligent—rather than simply imprudent—could expand 
its liability
  As a result 
of this ruling, these issues were destined for trial. 
50
 D.   The Execution: The Joint Proposal 
 and would certainly damage its reputation for 
reliability.  The judge concluded that the proceeding could include 
an examination of the company’s actions against a gross 
negligence standard.  This ruling could have lowered the utility’s 
BATNA and concomitantly raised its willingness to add value 
onto the settlement side of the scale. 
During the endgame phase, the negotiations are brought 
together to form a conclusion.  The parties draft the language of 
the proposal itself, and each must decide whether or not to sign, 
to support, to remain silent, or to oppose.  At this stage of 
negotiation of a long-lived settlement, it is axiomatic that there 
will be details impossible for the parties to foresee and plan for.  
At this point, not seeking agreement on all the implementation 
details, but instead seeking agreement on a process to resolve 
those implementation issues when they arise can avoid an 
eleventh-hour impasse and preserve the overall consensus.  Also, 
equally important is the inclusion of a dispute-resolution 
mechanism. 
The structure and administration of environmental benefit 
funding is a relevant example to look at.  Instead of choosing the 
organization or administrator to manage funds and oversee tree 
planting and other energy-saving environmental projects, the 
parties agreed upon a mutually acceptable process for a choice to 
be made, but did not themselves make the choice at the time of 
execution of the Joint Proposal.  In its order which adopted the 
 
 49. Id. at 4-9. 
 50. Under certain circumstances, a Commission determination could have a 
collateral effect on a subsequent judicial proceeding on identical issues. See 
Allied Chem. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 528 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1988). 
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terms of the Joint Proposal, the Commission directed the parties 
to identify, for commissioners, the chosen administrator for tree 
planting and greening projects.  The Commission reserved forty-
five days to reject the choice.  In fact, the process went, as 
anticipated, in the Joint Proposal and a Greening Administrator 
was selected, as well as an entity conducting the study. 
Two years after beginning the outage investigation, the 
NYPSC adopted the material terms of the Joint Proposal.51
E.   The Public Service Commission Adoption of the 
Joint   
  The 
Joint Proposal was signed and supported by Con Edison, NYPSC 
Staff, the New York State Consumer Protection Board, Western 
Queens Power for the People, New York State Assembly Member 
Richard Brodsky, New York City, and the Public Utility Law 
Project.  No opposing statements were filed with the NYPSC. 
Proposal Terms 
The specific terms of the Joint Proposal included the 
following.  First, rate benefits were afforded to all Con Edison 
customers by disallowing the inclusion in the company’s rates of 
$40 million of costs incurred to replace and repair its delivery 
system.  Additionally, Con Edison agreed not to seek recovery of 
$6 million in associated carrying charges.  In addition, Con 
Edison made available $17 million in benefit funds for the 
communities directly affected by the Long Island City network 
outage.  The $17 million encompassed direct payments and bill 
credits including: (1) a bill credit of $100 to each residential 
customer; (2) a bill credit of $200 to each small business 
customer; (3) a bill credit of $350 to each large business customer; 
(4) a payment of $100 to each residential claimant; and (5) $200 
for each business claimant for food spoilage. It also included 
$500,000 for a research entity (with a process for its selection by 
signatory parties) to study economic and health impacts of the 
outages.  Of the roughly $9 million remaining, one half was to be 
 
 51. See Case 06-E-0894, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Proceeding on Motion of 
the Comm’n to Investigate the Electric Power Outages in Consol. Edison 
Company of N.Y., Inc.’s Long Island City Electric Network—Prudence Phase, 
Order Adopting Terms of Joint Proposal with Modifications (July 24, 2008), 
available at http://www3.dps.state.ny.us/pscweb/WebFileRoom.nsf/0/A991CF5 
BB6DBE56F85257490004709B9/$File/303_06e0894_FINAL.pdf?OpenElement. 
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paid to a tree-planting organization (with a process to select it) 
for planting trees in affected communities, over and above New 
York City’s tree-planting program (the One Million Trees 
initiative).  The other half was to be paid to a Greening Projects 
Administrator (with a process for its selection) for other 
environmental initiatives, which “may include additional tree 
planting, the installation of measures that improve indoor or 
outdoor air quality, and other initiatives to improve the 
environment” within the community that suffered the outage.52
The Joint Proposal also required that Con Edison offer an 
apology—in English and Spanish—expressing the company’s 
sincere regrets for the network power outage and its 
consequences, for its performance, and for the extended hardships 
experienced by its customers as a result.
  
53  In its review of the 
terms of the Joint Proposal, the Commission insisted the apology 
be signed by the utility’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 
and mailed separately to each customer, to which Con Edison 
agreed.54
In its order adopting the Joint Proposal terms, the 
Commission noted that “[a]s all parties have recognized, these 
benefits would not be available in a Commission order, except 
with the consent of the parties . . . We expect the greening 
projects contemplated under the Joint Proposal to assist in 
improving energy efficiency and reducing demand, in part due to 
the cooling characteristics of adding trees and other greening 
projects in metropolitan areas.”
  And in exchange for all of the above, the prudence 
investigation was terminated. 
55
AFTERWORD 
 
On the issue of whether the value was returned, indications 
are that it was.  As the study nears completion, the Greening 
Administrator has been selected and the payments and refunds 
have been received; none of which could have resulted from the 
prudence litigation.  One of the community representatives to the 
negotiations reported that the morning after the Con Edison 
 
 52. Id. at 3-4. 
 53. Id. at 4. 
 54. Id. at 8. 
 55. Id. at 7. 
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checks arrived in customers’ mailboxes—two years after the 
outage—she was pleasantly surprised to step out of her elevator 
on the way to work and be greeted by a round of applause from 
her neighbors.  Additionally, Con Edison recently announced a $6 
million, eighteen-month smart grid pilot in northwestern Queens, 
the same area that suffered from the 2006 outage.  The pilot will 
test a state-of-the-art technological upgrade to significantly 
reduce electricity usage, and to monitor infrastructure problems, 
by empowering consumers to track and control their own energy 
use.56
 
 
 
 56. Simon Akam, Con Ed Tests a ‘Smart Grid’ in Queens, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
2009, available at http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/con-ed-tests-a-
smart-grid-in-queens. 
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